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Abstract 
In various industrial plants like power and chemical plants, the system operation is controlled by embedded controller(s). Any 
intentional malfunction of a critical controller can lead to shut down or failure of vital parts. It further leads the control plant into 
unsafe mode. Malware attacks can result in tremendous cost to the organization in terms of cleanup activity. Process related 
threats occur when the attacker gains control of the system and performs unintended actions. Industrial plants being a complex 
system need a wholesome approach for attack detection and prevention. In this paper we propose to use a geometric method to 
detect anomaly in a control system behavior which can possibly indicate a malware attack.  
The paper focuses on analysis of the large data sets for anomaly detection by using computational geometric methods to observe 
and analyze trends in the controller’s output. 
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1. Introduction 
There have been an increasing number of malware attacks on the industrial control systems like Stuxnet in 2010 
[1], Maroochy Shire Sewage attack in 2000[1], water filtering plant of Pennsylvania in 2006 and Davis-Besse power 
plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio in 2003[2]. Increasing vulnerabilities in the cyber physical system have made information 
security an immediate concern and need for detecting and controlling the spread of such malware. Information 
security methods like authentication and integrity are inadequate in securing these control systems.  Attacks on 
control system can result in tremendous costs to an organization in rebuild and recovery activities.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is integrations of computation with the physical processes.  Control systems 
automate the tasks once performed by the humans by sensing the environmental conditions, executing the 
programmed logic and then actuating physical equipment to perform a desire task.  Control systems are made up of 
sensors along with computational and communication capabilities. Data received by the actuator causes necessary 
action(s) on the physical system. Sensors measure the physical system states and transmit it to the distributed 
controllers. A control action is a reactive process and failure of any non-redundant sensor or actuator can cause 
irreparable damage to the system under control. 
 
Statistical techniques like SPRT are useful in the malware detection as mentioned in [1, 2, and 4]. In a cyber-
physical system like SCADA, data is collected in the form of bug reports and system status logs. These data can 
provide the vital historic information for understanding system behavior and its trends. However, these files are huge 
in size and difficult to inspect manually.  
The paper focuses on using computational geometric techniques for understanding the controller profile to detect 
anomalous behavior. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of related work. Section 3 
presents mathematical framework for vulnerability analysis. Section 4 explains computational geometry and its 
implications on control system using four tank model. Section 5 concludes with future scope.  
2. Related Work 
Alvaro et. al. in [1, 2, 12, and 14] have explained the need to secure CPS using the example of Stuxnet attack and 
have demonstrated various attacks on Tennessee-Eastman process control system model. They have used statistical 
techniques for attack models analysis. Various attacks like bias attack, geometric attack, stealth attacks are explained 
in [1].  M. Basseville’s [3, 7] statistical techniques for fault detection were extended for analysis of false data 
injection attack (Yao Liu [16]) using four tank model by Hemangi et. al. [4,26]. Shyamasundar in [17] has described 
a big data approach for protecting and securing SCADA from malware attacks and analyzing data log files generated 
through SCADA system. Various methods exist for the analysis of data log such as sampling method [6], statistical 
method [3, 7, and 14] and continuous query of data stream [8, 9]. Izchak Sharfman [5] describes various search 
engines with different mirrors (filters) for data monitoring. Computational geometric approach has been used for 
analysis of large data stream by Fabio Pasqualetti et. al. [13, 14].  
3. Mathematical Framework And Vulnerability Analysis For CPS 
Cyber physical system plays the vital roles of controlling as well as monitoring critical physical processes. CPS is 
made of hierarchy of computer elements running a discretized control algorithm and is connected to sensors and 
control elements. Controller acts as the heart of a control system. Control system is represented in LTI model as 
given by Equation (1) and (2) [27]. 
 
x(k+1)= Ax(k) + Bu(k)+wk                                       (1) 
 
y(k)= Cx(k)+vk                                      (2) 
 
Where x(k) ȯ Rn,  y(k) ȯ R, Aȯ Rnxn, B ȯ Rnxm and C ȯ Rpxm. 
 
An attack that causes the state matrix ‘A’ to change is termed as state attack and an output attack when 
measurement vector is targeted. Attacks on CPS are broadly classified as targeted and non- targeted. Targeted 
Attacks are further classified into:- 
1. Input Data Attacks: Control Signal is targeted which results in a state change of the system. 
2. Output Data Attacks: Measurement signal is targeted.  
3. State Attacks: Attacker tries to manipulate any of the factors that affect the states of the system. 
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The drift in the estimated value is given by equation (7) which is monitored for the change in the system 
behaviour. 
ݑ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݁ሺݐሻ െ ݒሺݐሻ   ሺ͹ሻ
3.1.2 Intersections of Convex Hulls 
 Consider convex hulls P and Q as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2- Intersection of two convex hulls 
 
Two convex hulls, P and Q intersect such that there is more than one point in common, and their intersection can 
be represented with set of ‘n’ points. These points forms a new convex hull with co-ordinates that satisfy both 
function f(P) and f(Q) that govern convex hull P and Q respectively. Intersection of convex hull can be represented 
with equation (8) [21].  
 
f(P) ש f(Q) = min (P,Q)  =  ଵ
ଶ
ቂܲ ൅ ܳ െඥሺܲ െ ܳሻଶቃ (8) 
4. Computational Analysis for CPS 
  
Figure 3:- Anomaly detecting monitor with in-build computational logic.  
 
Proposed architecture of the anomaly detecting controller is as shown in Figure 3. Let  
୙ሺ୲ሻ
ሱۛሮ be the control plant 
input and 
୷భሺ୲ሻ
ሱۛ ሮǥ
୷౤ሺ୲ሻ
ሱۛ ሮ  be the possible set of outputs at time ‘t’. Let
ଡ଼ᇱሺ୲ሻ
ሱۛ ሮ  and 
ଡ଼ሺ୲ሻ
ሱۛሮ  be plant and sensor outputs 
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respectively. Output of controller 
୙ሺ୲ାଵሻ
ሱۛ ۛۛ ሮ is validated by the computational analysis method (Monitor).  Construct 
convex hull for 
୷భሺ୲ሻ
ሱۛ ሮǥ
୷౤ሺ୲ሻ
ሱۛ ሮ .This convex hull acts as a bench mark for comparing various outputs of the controller 
and further deciding the amount of intersection of the new convex hull with the trained system. 
4.1 Experiment and Simulation 
  For analysis and simulation of anomaly in the controlled plant, four tank system [as shown in Figure 4] is 
considered as a control plant. The system includes two inputs (speed of pump) and two outputs (level of two tanks), 
where the two outputs are controlled by two inputs. This model is used for verification and validation of 
computational algorithms.  
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:- Four tank System Model                              Figure 5:- Schematic representation in control plant 
 
Four tank model is considered as a controlled system and its output value is subjected to convex hull algorithm 
(in-built in Monitor) as shown in Figure 5. Output of the four tank system is sent to a Kalman filter, whose 
innovation values act as an input to the monitor. In a non-attack scenario, computational logic is trained with the 
normal data. Once trained in the convex hull approach, computational logic needs to continuously validate the data 
for various attack scenarios. For a given spectrum of input and output to four tank model, convex hull is generated. 
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State transition Matrix for above system is given by:- 
 
A = [െ௔భ൫ඥଶ௚௛భ൯
஺భ
    0  ௔యඥଶ௚௛య
஺భ
       0, 
              0    െ௔మ൫ඥଶ௚௛మ൯
஺మ
     0 ௔రඥଶ௚௛ర
஺మ
, 
             0  0          ௔య൫ඥଶ௚௛య൯
஺య
      0     , 
             0  0    0             െ௔ర൫ඥଶ௚௛ర൯
஺ర
] 
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Monitored parameter is estimated height of the individual tank in cms (as input) and difference in height of tanks in 
cms (as output) for 1000 interval. Output is simulated after 500th interval when the system (Four tank model) output 
reaches its stable value and the Kalman filter output (innovation) achieves convergences. 
As shown in Figure 6, convex hull for normal and bias attack scenario is generated for four tank model output. 
Both convex hulls are non – intersecting. There is a complete new convex hull generated in bias attack than in the 
normal plant and hence anomaly can easily be detected in this attack scenario.  
 
 
Figure 6:- Non - Intersection of convex hull for normal and minimum bias attack 
5. Conclusion And Future Work 
Computational geometric approach has an advantage of analysing the complex data obtained from an LTI plant 
using geometrical representation techniques like convex hull method. This approach helps in the cyber physical 
system modelling and vulnerability analysis by observing the trends of their convex hulls and their intersection. The 
paper proposes detection techniques for analyzing the anomalous behaviour diagnosis. Algorithm realization is 
demonstrated using the four tank model.  
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